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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RO~ER STEPHEN SHUFFIELD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SAMUEL SMITH, Warden 
Utah State Prison, 
Oefenda nt -Respondent 
Case No. 14214 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Roger Stephen Shuffield, appeals from a judgment 
entered against him in the Third Judicial District Court on a petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant plead guilty to second degree murder in 1974 and was 
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On July 3, 1975, a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus hearing was held before Judge G. Hal Taylor and his 
petition was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court decision and that 
petitioner be either given a new trial or released from custody. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 197 4, the defendant was charged with Murder in the First 
Degree, a capital offense. His attorneys advised him that there was 
a good chance that he would receive the death penalty if convicted and that 
the defendant could avoid this risk by pleading guilty to Murder in the 
Second Degree. The defendant, for the sole purpose of avoiding the death 
penalty, plead guilty to Murder in the Second Degree. At the habeas 
corpus hearing, the defendant testified that he was unaware of the fact 
that by pleading guilty he was effectively giving up his right to confront 
witnesses at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND 
INTELLIGENTLY MADE BECAUSE IT WAS ENTERED UPON THE ADVICE 
OF COUNSEL THAT THE DEATH PENALTY COULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED 
WHEN IN FACT UTAH'S DEATH PENALTY PROVISION WAS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL. 
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme 
Court declared unconstitutional death penalty schemes which allow juries 
to impose the death penalty in an arbitrary manner without adequate guidelines. 
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In Kelbach and Lance v. Utah, 408 U.S. 935, 33 L. Ed. 2d 75, 92 
S. Ct. 2858, (1972), the Utah Supreme Court's decision upholding 
the· constitutionality of Utah's prior death penalty provision was appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court. That court, in a memorandum decision 
stated: 
"Judgement vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death 
penalty imposed and case remanded to the Supreme Court 
of Utah for further proceedings." 33 L. Ed. at 751 
The court cited Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 33 L. Ed. 744, 
92 S. Ct. 2845 (1972), in which it held the Massachusetts death penalty 
statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
It is thus clear that Utah's prior death penalty statute was 
effectively declared unconstitutional in the Lance and Kelbach decision. 
In that Utah's present states, Utah Code Annotated Section 76-3-207, does 
not remedy the infirmities found to exist under the _prior statute, it also 
is unconstitutional on the basis of Furman v. Georgia in that it allows the 
jury to make the determination without adequate guidelines of whether a 
defendant should live or die. It is clear from the above that the defendant 
entered a guilty plea in fear of the death penalty provision which was 
unconstitutional. It cannot reasonably be stated that such a plea was made 
knowingly and intelligently when in fact the defendant gave up valuable 
constitutional rights, e.g. Fifth Amendment rights, the right to a trial by 
jury, the right to confrontation of witnesses, in return for nothing since he 
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would have received the same penalty anyway. The present death penalty 
provision states unequivocally that if this statute is ever declared 
unqmstitutional, life imprisonment is the appropriate penalty. Therefore 
at the time the defendant entered the guilty plea, the only penalty which 
could have been mnstitutionally imposed was life imprisonment, the same 
penalty that is imposed for the crime that the defendant plead guilty to. 
In Shaw v. U.S. 299 F. Supp. 824 (1969), the defendant was 
indicted for violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act and plead guilty to 
avoid the death penalty provision which was subsequently held unconstitutional 
in U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, The court, in holding that U. S. v .. Jackson 
should be given retroactive effect, stated: 
Plea voluntary on its face became involuntary in fact because of 
the coercive effect of possible capital punishment which should 
not have confronted the accused in making up his mind how to 
plead. Life sentence was void and must be vacated. " 299 F. 
Supp. at 833. 
The record of the habeas corpus hearing discloses that the 
defendant's sole reason for pleading guilty was to avoid the death penalty. 
(R-ll). In Armstrong v. Egeler, 389 F. Supp. 483 (1975)~ the court held 
that the fact that the defendant was not told he was eligible for parole 
was a critical factor in determining whether the defendant's guilty plea was 
intelligently made. The case law is thus clear on the point that knowledge 
of possible sentencing is a "critical factor" in determining if a guilty plea 
is intelligently entered. In that the defendant in the instant case entered his 
guilty plea based upon the misconstrued validity of an unconsti.tutional 
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death penalty provision, that plea and the consequent sentence of life 
imprisonment must be vacated. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN 
VIOLATION OF BOYKIN V. ALABAMA, 395 U. S. 238, IN THAT THE 
RECORD BELOW FAILS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
KNEW HE WAS WAIVING IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
In Boykin v. Alabama, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
set out the requirements for the trial court to adhere to in assuring that the 
defendant knows that he is giving up specific constitutional rights when he 
enters a plea of guilty to a crime. The court noted the grave importance 
of such a requirement: 
"Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver 
that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state 
criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory 
self-incirmination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and 
applicable to the Sates by reaEO n of the Fourteenth. (Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U. S!, 1). Second, is the right to trial by jury. 
(Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145). Third, is the right to 
confront ones accusers:- (Pointer v. Texas, 380 u. s. 400)." 
395 U. S. at 243 
The court was explicit on the point that what is required by 
due process is that the defendant know that he is giving up the al:ove 
mentioned constitutional rights. The court stated: 
"what is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment 
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable 
in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has 
a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequences." 395 U. S. at 243-244. 
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The habeas corpus record in the instant case clearly reveals that 
the defendant did not in fact know of the constitutional rights he was giving 
up. The defendant specifically stated at the habeas corpus proceeding 
that he was unaware that if he plead guilty, he would be waiving his right 
to confront his accusers at trial. (R -10). Surely Boykin v. Alabama 
requires more than a mere recital of the rights waived by a plea of 
guilty. Boykin requires that the record below affirmatively disclose that the 
defendant in fact know that he is waiving those rights. Anything less than 
this relegates the due process clause to a matter of form rather than substance 
and renders Boykin v. Alabama meaningless. It is thus clear that the 
defendant was denied due process under Boykin v. Alabama in that he did 
not know that he was waiving the right to confront his accusers when he 
entered his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently 
made because it was based upon an unconstitutional death penalty provisio11. 
Additionally, defendant was denied due process of law in violation of 
Boykin v. Alabama because the record below does not disclose that defendant 
in fact knew that he was waiving his right to confront his accusers and 
therefore the guilty plea was not voluntarily made. For the above-mentioned 
reasons, defendant's plea of guilty and sentence of life imprisonment should 
be vacated and a new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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